INTRODUCTION
The prevailing consensus among climate scientists is that the world is now "committed" to a significant amount of global average warming before efforts to reverse the buildup of greenhouse gases (GHGs) in the atmosphere can even begin to succeed. 1 The magnitude, timing and distribution of expected warming remains uncertain, and depends on future political decisions about climate change mitigation as well as the inherent uncertainty in our ability to predict future climatic conditions given available modeling and assessment methods. Current model projections, however, suggest that even the lowest projected levels of warming will generate significant disruption in a wide range of physical conditions around the globe, and that the highest levels of warming could cause human and environmental impacts of catastrophic proportions, at least in many regions. 2 Given these realities, it is increasingly clear that adaptation as well as mitigation will be necessary to deal with climate disruption. In the case of adaptation, a looming issue is how to balance the likely need and compassionate impulse to provide financial and other relief to victims of climate disruption with the equally compelling need to reduce the overall risk from those effects. Those two goals, however, are not always compatible or consistent.
Even absent climate change, disaster relief is often controversial if it encourages behavior that increases long-term risk. For example, compensating property owners in flood-or storm-prone regions may encourage construction in those areas, thus increasing societal risk. 3 Likewise, subsidized drought relief programs might encourage farmers to engage in riskier agricultural practices-such as growing water-intensive crops in arid regions or using inefficient irrigation methods-because the promise of public relief and subsidized water reduces or eliminates incentives for farmers to internalize those risks in their business decisions. As a result, drought relief policy might impede more sustainable agricultural practices and policies, including policies designed to match agricultural practices to local environmental conditions. That perverse feedback can render the community even more vulnerable to future drought.
This balance between compassion, risk allocation, and risk reduction in disaster relief policy will become even more important if adverse effects of climate disruption materialize as predicted. 4 The compassionate response will be to compensate victims for changes in local conditions caused by global economic forces that are beyond their control. If relief allows those victims to continue practices that render them vulnerable, however, those policies will increase long-term risks. Moreover, vulnerability increases with the frequency of the event, which decreases the recovery interval between disasters. 5 The result will likely be a vicious cycle of relief and increased risk. Given the likelihood of this scenario, perhaps a more "compassionate" approach is to implement systemic policies to reduce vulnerability to climate-induced disasters by increasing the sustainability of various economic sectors in advance.
Although the same analysis could be performed for other changes expected due to climate disruption (such as sea level rise or increased flooding), drought and agricultural policy provides one good model for analysis of this concept. First, increased incidence and severity of drought are among the most serious expected climate change impacts. 6 Second, past drought relief policies have faced similar tensions in balancing compassion and risk. As is true with respect to many kinds of disaster, the modern governmental response to drought has been driven by the desire to compensate victims for harm caused by unpredictable changes in natural conditions, through financial aid, free or subsidized water, or relief from regulations or other legal requirements. Although drought relief is the product of a range of political, economic and other factors, 7 compassion is arguably one dominant motivating force. We do not like to see people suffer in their lives and livelihoods, especially for factors we believe are beyond their control, and for events we perceive to be rare and unpredictable. Moreover, when farmersarguably the most frequent victims of drought-bear the economic risk of uncertainty to produce essential food and fiber products, it seems equitable to distribute those risks across society.
An alternative goal of drought policy, however, is long-term risk reduction. For example, policies could be designed to promote drought-resistant crops or crop varieties, to encourage more efficient irrigation methods, and even to encourage farmers to relocate from areas expected to face increasing aridity to those likely to experience more favorable conditions. Rather than devoting scarce financial and other resources to reactive policies that are likely to increase long-term risks, a sustainability-based approach to disaster prevention will reduce long-term vulnerability and potentially enhance the welfare of the beneficiaries as well as society as a whole.
A disaster prevention strategy designed to reduce vulnerability to drought may require changes to deep-rooted economic policies in the agricultural and other sectors of the economy. At the most basic level, it will require us to rethink what conditions we consider a "disaster", as opposed to the 3 normal range of variability in weather and other conditions within particular regions. That requires an initial inquiry into what we even mean by the term "drought". Second, a prevention-oriented strategy requires that we identify factors that tend to increase drought vulnerability, and to evaluate potential ways to reduce that vulnerability. Third, it will require us to revise our philosophy regarding the range of conditions that warrant subsidized public drought relief to protect farming and other water-intensive activities, especially in areas that may no longer be hospitable to those pursuits. In the United States, however, that shift will also require us to rethink some of the core components of national agricultural policy dating back to the New Deal. Thus, to understand the effect of current laws and policies that have the greatest effect on drought in the United States, we also need to explore the history of, and rationale for, both U.S. drought law and policy and relevant aspects of U.S. agricultural law and policy.
Part II of this article provides the analytical framework for a prevention-based or sustainabilitybased approach to drought mitigation in a changing climate. First, it explores the nature and definition of drought, and how the manner in which we conceptualize drought affects drought law and policy. Second, it evaluates conditions that increase human vulnerability to drought, and what might be done to reduce that vulnerability. Part III critiques the history of U.S. water and drought law and policy and related aspects of federal agricultural law and policy from these perspectives, and evaluates changes in U.S. law and policy 8 that would promote more sustainable water use and thereby reduce society's vulnerability to drought. Part IV concludes with some preliminary comments on the broader lessons that the preceding analysis might suggest for climate change adaptation strategies more generally.
II. AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK: FACTORS AFFECTING DROUGHT RISK AND IMPACTS
Public policy toward drought response is shaped by perceptions about the nature and frequency of drought and its impacts on various economic sectors. Risk allocation decisions regarding drought have significant implications for public and private investment. Those decisions are based on a range of considerations, including the perceived rarity and predictability of drought, the nature and value of activities to be protected, and the fairness of concentrating drought risk within small groups of people and businesses rather than distributing risks across society. However, drought policy is also influenced by the nature and location of activities affected by drought, and the vulnerability of those activities to scarce water supplies and other conditions associated with drought (such as heat spells and high winds). A more detailed analysis of competing drought laws and policies, therefore, should consider both the nature and definition of drought, and factors that affect drought vulnerability.
A.
Impacts, Perceptions and Definitions of Drought
1.

Impacts and perceptions of drought
Drought has plagued civilizations throughout history. 9 Extreme drought can cause severe economic and social dislocation, as in the Dust Bowl in the United States during the Great Depression, 10 8 Although this article focuses on U.S. law, the analysis suggests lessons for other parts of the world as well. 9 See WAYNE C. PALMER, METEOROLOGICAL DROUGHT, U.S. DEP'T OF COMM., U.S. WEATHER BUR. RESEARCH PAPER NO. 45, at 1 (1965) ("Drought has been cited as the scourge of mankind since biblical times."). 10 See generally VANCE JOHNSON, HEAVEN'S TABLELAND, THE DUST BOWL STORY (1947) 241, 250-51 (1998) . that way." 19 We can express essentially the same idea in economic terms as well: "[A]s a society, we tend to place a high discount rate on the future when faced with a crisis." 20 Complacency occurs in part because drought is a "creeping" phenomenon, the onset of which is gradual and therefore difficult to identify until serious impacts have already occurred. 21 As a result, governments usually respond to drought on an emergency basis, and measures developed in that atmosphere tend to be reactive rather than preventive and proactive. 22 Moreover, because even the most serious droughts inevitably give way to more favorable conditions, the public and private sector alike tends to fall prey to what drought experts have called the "hydro-illogical" cycle. This phenomenon is characterized by panic and ad hoc, reactive approaches in the face of serious drought, followed by apathy and a return to past practices once the rains return. 23 The creeping nature of drought generates a difficult policy tension in determining when various policy responses to drought (such as relief payments or water rationing) should begin. If drought relief is triggered too readily, farmers might receive unintended windfalls and be encouraged to engage in riskier practices in the future; but if they come too late, the ability of farmers to recover from drought might be impaired. More importantly, complacency and collective loss of memory during "the rich times" can lead societies to pursue unsustainable water and agricultural policies and practices. Those unsustainable practices, in turn, render regions more vulnerable to the effects of drought when dry weather returns. Avoiding this cyclic syndrome requires attention to the definition of drought.
Drought definitions
Drought defies universal definition because it is a relative concept that varies with location and economic, social and political context. However, the definition of drought can profoundly change the legal, economic, social and environmental implications of drought response policies. As two prominent drought experts noted, "…drought, like beauty, is largely defined by the beholder and how it may affect his or her activity or enterprise." 24 A survey conducted in 1985 identified more than 150 published definitions of drought in the academic literature. 25 The most basic and universally accepted definitions 19 JOHN STEINBECK, EAST OF EDEN 5-6 (1963) . See also HEAVEN'S TABLELAND, supra note 10, at 286 ("It was hard, when everyone was making money, to remember how fast men could go broke when the rain quit."). 20 compare supply to need, i.e., in general, drought is a deficiency in precipitation that leads to deficits in water supply relative to human and environmental needs. 26 Thus, drought has a physical component (deficiency in precipitation) and an environmental, social or economic component (need or demand).
Experts group drought definitions into four categories.
27 "Meteorological drought" is a sustained reduction in precipitation over a defined period of time relative to a defined baseline condition.
28
"Agricultural drought" is a deficiency in soil moisture relative to crop or forage needs, 29 leading to reduced crop yield or quality or total crop failures. "Hydrological drought" is a deficiency in water storage and flow in natural or artificial systems, including reduced soil moisture, groundwater depth, stream flow, runoff volume, and water levels in lakes and reservoirs.
30 "Socioeconomic drought" refers to a deficiency in water relative to some economic need or resource, such as livestock watering, irrigation, hydroelectric power generation, or municipal and industrial use. 31 The latter three categories might be grouped together as "effects-based" drought definitions.
Even that system of categorization, however, does not deal with other variables that further complicate policy responses to drought. Precipitation, for example, varies relative to geography.
32 Levels that would be abundant in an arid region might set record lows in a normally humid zone. 33 Therefore, a legal drought definition that fails to account for regional variation could result in perverse policy incentives or socioeconomic impacts. A definition based on conditions in humid areas might trigger drought relief too readily in an arid region, leading to insufficient incentives to reduce drought risk through more sustainable water policies. Conversely, a definition based on arid conditions might lead to significant hardship in an area accustomed to more abundant water supplies. 26 See Wilhite & Buchanan-Smith, supra note 24, at 4 (defining drought as a deficiency in precipitation relative to "expected" or "normal" conditions resulting in insufficient water to meet human or environmental needs); Cooley, supra note 13, at 92 (defining drought as "a hydrological extreme caused by a persistent and abnormal moisture deficiency that has adverse impacts on vegetation, animals, and people over a relatively large area"); U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, NATIONAL STUDY OF WATER MANAGEMENT DURING DROUGHT, THE REPORT TO THE U.S. CONGRESS 4 (1995) (hereinafter NATIONAL STUDY OF WATER MANAGEMENT DURING DROUGHT) (defining drought as "periods of time when natural or managed water systems do not provide enough water to meet human and environmental uses because of natural shortfalls in precipitation or streamflow"). 27 29 See id. at 114-115. 30 See id. at 115. 31 See id. Arguably, agricultural drought could be considered a subset of socioeconomic drought, but is distinguished by the direct physical relationship between meteorological and other related climatic conditions (such as temperature and humidity) and both soil moisture and plant needs. 32 See id. 33 As such, absolute measures of low precipitation (e.g., less than x inches per year) are suited only to the specific climates for which they are derived. More relative approaches define drought by reference to a percentage of "normal" or "average" precipitation within a region (e.g., less than x % of average per unit of time), but suggest other difficulties. See id. at 114; Hayes, supra note 25.
Even within a given region there is really no such thing as "normal" precipitation, due to significant natural variation. 34 We can use historical data to calculate "average" precipitation within an area, or to characterize the statistical probability of different amounts of precipitation within a defined region. However, there is no single correct rule to define what variance from an established norm, and  over what period time, is appropriate to characterize a deficiency as meteorological drought. 35 Does drought occur whenever precipitation drops below "average", or only when it deviates from the norm by a specified amount, such as the lowest quartile or the lowest ten percent of the normal range? Does one month of such deviation suffice to declare a meteorological drought, or is a longer period required? Scientific factors might influence those decisions, but a policy judgment is necessary to determine when drought relief or other governmental response is justified, and that choice will influence the degree to which the policy promotes relief at the expense of risk reduction, or vice versa.
The definition of meteorological drought can also depend on the length of the available historic record, and the sources and reliability of the information. Even longstanding historic records (a century or more) may not fully characterize the climate within a given region. 36 For example, based on dendochronological 37 and other sources of information, the past century has been among the wettest in the American West for at least the past millennium.
38 Thus, if we use "below normal" by reference to the past century to characterize drought, and if conditions revert to "normal" as defined by the past millennium, we can expect persistent "drought" conditions to occur in the future even absent additional changes induced by climate disruption. That could result in a drought policy response all or virtually all of the time, which could convert drought "relief" into more of a permanent subsidy for water use.
Even with these definitional complexities, the concept of meteorological drought only addresses the supply side of the equation. The remaining three categories of drought relate water supply to various human needs as well as antecedent conditions. Agricultural, hydrological or socioeconomic drought is usually preceded by meteorological drought, but is not an inevitable result; rather, it depends on prior conditions, either natural or artificial in origin. 39 Agricultural drought might not follow from meteorological drought if a preceding wet period caused significant storage of soil moisture, or if crop water needs decline due to cooler temperatures. 40 Similarly, whether meteorological drought leads to 34 See Hayes, supra note 25 (noting that mean precipitation can vary from the median because precipitation often does not reflect a normal probability distribution); Wilhite and Glantz, supra note 21, at 114 (critiquing use of 30-year regional mean as definition of "normal" precipitation due to significant inter-annual variability). 35 See PALMER, supra note 9, at 2 (noting that all drought definitions reflect some degree of arbitrariness); Heim, supra note 27, at 1150 (noting that no single index captures all aspects of the drought phenomenon hydrological drought depends on preceding water conditions and other factors. 41 If a dry year follows a wet period in which a lot of water has been stored in the system (soil, aquifers, surface water and reservoirs), physical impacts to natural or human water resources may be small. However, even a moderately dry year following a long period of incremental reduction in stored water can have more significant hydrologic impacts. Other environmental variables that affect the hydrologic effects of drought include temperature and humidity (which affect evapo-transpiration rates and precipitation timing and intensity (snow versus rain; or steady, moderate rain versus infrequent downpours).
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More important for this analysis, effects-based drought depends on the balance between supply and demand, which reflects controllable artificial factors as well as uncontrollable natural conditions. 43 For example, agricultural drought might be prevented or mitigated if replacement or supplemental water can be brought from other sources, or if water needs can be reduced sufficiently by growing less water-intensive crops or crop varieties, by fallowing marginal lands, or by using more efficient irrigation methods. 44 Likewise, municipal water demand can be reduced through a wide variety of mechanisms, such as real cost and accelerating block pricing, other financial incentives, mandatory regulations, or rationing. 45 Thus, water supplies that might seem luxurious to low-demand communities might be considered a severe socioeconomic drought in profligate ones. Thus, for effects-based drought definitions that relate supply to demand, human behavior can "cause" droughts through unsustainable land or water use. 46 Drought definitions that establish a low threshold for relief or subsidies might relieve serious local or regional impacts, but in ways that decrease incentives to reduce drought risk and impacts through sustainable water use and management. Effects-defined drought can occur more readily due to vulnerability, but drought definitions and policies can also exacerbate vulnerability.
B.
Vulnerability Assessment
Disaster assessment is a function of both the natural hazard itself (for example, the probability that an earthquake of a certain magnitude will occur) to an approach that relates the hazard to the vulnerability of individuals and population groups (such as the ability of buildings to withstand an earthquake of a particular strength). 47 Overall risk reflects both the likelihood and potential severity of hazard and the vulnerability of the at-risk population, defined as "the characteristics of a person or group in terms of their capacity to anticipate, cope with, resist, and recover from the impact of a natural hazard," 48 or more simply as "the potential for loss." 49 Actual harm depends on both the likelihood and magnitude of the hazard and the ability of various populations to withstand or respond to its effects. 41 See Wilhite & Glantz, supra note 21, at 115. 42 See Wilhite & Glantz, supra note 21, at 115; Heim, supra note 27, at 1149-50. 43 See Redmond, supra note 21, at 1144 (commenting that demand factor is more subject to human manipulation). 44 See COPING WITH WATER SCARCITY, supra note 6, at 270-316. 45 Vulnerability is a function of geographic factors such as where people live relative to potential natural disasters (floodplains, seismic risk zones, etc.), plus a range of less easily characterized but equally important social, economic and political factors. Those include financial reserves and alternative sources of income when livelihoods are disrupted, access to physical assets and resources to cope with and to recover from hazards, distribution of wealth within a society or economy, stability and security of legal and political rights, and discrimination between population groups. 50 Thus, although poverty is one key factor in generating vulnerability, poverty alone neither guarantees that particular individuals or groups will be vulnerable to particular natural or human-created hazards, nor fully explains why.
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From a global perspective, it will be critical to assess vulnerability to drought induced by climate disruption. For people in developing countries who already live a marginal existence, relatively small shifts in the availability of water and other key resources will have drastic adverse impacts on food security.
52 Drought and ensuing famine often either cause or coincide with armed conflict, or conflict significantly exacerbates the effects of drought and famine. 53 Experts predict that higher temperatures and drought will cause a major food crisis in many parts of the world over the next century. 54 Those effects are likely to produce a crisis of refugees and ensuing internal and external conflicts.
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Even in the United States, scientists predict an increase in the frequency, severity, and geographic extent of drought due to climate disruption. 56 And despite the comparatively large amount of financial, technical, and other resources available to adapt to drought in the United States, past U.S. drought responses suggest that improvements are possible. If more severe and prolonged droughts occur in the United States due to climate disruption, choices between relief-based responses and strategies to reduce drought vulnerability will become even more difficult but even more important.
While poverty is the main source of vulnerability in the developing world, inefficiency may be the most significant culprit in the developed world. In countries with access to sufficient capital and engineering expertise, the traditional approach to imbalances between supply and demand has been to increase water storage or supply. 57 Regions with high water demand, therefore, such as agricultural areas that depend on irrigation, experience more serious impacts from a given shortage than will areas with lower water needs. Likewise, growing cities that fail to curb per capita water use or to reduce leaks 50 and other sources of inefficiency in their storage and delivery systems will be more vulnerable to drought than will more efficient regions. Of course, efficiency improvements will only decrease vulnerability if the "saved" water really serves as a reserve against future drought, and not to fuel additional growth. 58 Moreover, government investments, subsidies and other incentives can promote excess water use, or development in drought-prone regions, in ways that increase vulnerability. A comparison of responses to two historically significant U.S. droughts highlights these issues.
1.
The Dust Bowl Experience in the Great Plains
The history of farming and ranching in the Great Plains exemplifies the boom and bust cycles and patterns of complacency 59 that can increase vulnerability even in wealthy and resilient societies. The Great Plains has been vulnerable to devastating boom and bust cycles over the past century and a half, and the downturns usually coincided with severe drought. 60 Aided by U.S. government land polices designed to promote westward expansion, and encouraged by railroad companies, land speculators and newspapers formed largely to promote those interests, settlers from the East flocked to the Great Plains during the late 1800s and early 1900s. 61 Those migrants were lured by the promise of economic selfsufficiency, cheap and fertile land, and favorable weather. However, they brought farming practices and assumptions about weather rooted in Europe and the eastern United States, but that ultimately were not sustainable in the very different and highly variable climate of the Great Plains.
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Farmers and ranchers in the Great Plains fell victim to the "hydro-illogical" cycle. 63 Settlers overstocked the range and overplanted crops during favorable weather and high prices, leading to serious failures during drought, excess summer heat, and freezing winters. 64 Government policies and economic conditions encouraged boom cycles when commodity prices rose and export markets expanded, and driven by advancements in agricultural technology such as the steel plow, the gasolinedriven tractor, and the combine. 65 Thus, as with overuse of water, ultimately an excess use or misuse of resources (land, capital, technology) during the rich times, rather than simply an absence of resources during the poor times, contributed to the vulnerability of Great Plains agriculturalists to drought. 58 Some argue that inefficiency is a useful buffer against drought because efficiency improvements can be tapped when needed during drought. See NATIONAL STUDY OF WATER MANAGEMENT DURING DROUGHT, supra note 26, at 20 (1995). Except for simple rationing programs, however, which can be disruptive, water efficiency improvements often require time and money to implement, and cannot simply be turned on or off when drought hits. 59 See supra notes 19 to 23 and accompanying text. 60 See generally THE FUTURE OF THE GREAT PLAINS, supra note 10; HEAVEN'S TABLELAND, supra note 10; DROUGHT OF The ultimate example came during the Dust Bowl years of the Great Depression, which devastated both the land and its human settlers. 66 The physical cause of the Dust Bowl was the worst period of heat and drought to date in the measured meteorological record throughout much of the United States. 67 However, similar conditions of wind, drought, and heat had occurred previously, without the dramatic dust storms, soil erosion, and other catastrophic resulting environmental impacts. 68 Overgrazing denuded the natural rangelands, and mechanical plowing, cultivation and harvest in long, straight rows exposed the underlying topsoil to the effects of heat, wind and drought. 69 Likewise, the Dust Bowl highlights the relationship between unsustainable fiscal and economic policies and drought vulnerability. Lured by easy access to credit and optimism that land values and commodity prices would inevitably continue to rise, farmers and absentee owners saddled themselves with mortgages and chattel debt to finance a new generation of efficient but expensive equipment to support the industrial farm economy. 70 When crop prices declined dramatically, or when crop yields fell or failed altogether due to drought and the accompanying dust storms, this speculation and leverage could not be sustained. Land values plummeted, and farmers had no reserves to cover their debt and to buy seed grain or livestock feed to carry them through the protracted drought. This left insufficient equity to cover loans, leading to farm failures, bankruptcies, foreclosures and bank failures. 71 The U.S. government responded to the Dust Bowl with drought relief and other agricultural policies designed both to provide compassionate assistance to farmers and to change farming practices in ways designed to prevent similar effects in the future. 72 Some policies sought to reduce vulnerability through more sustainable farming practices such as conservation tillage, planting of windbreaks, and return of marginal farmlands to native grasses. 73 Price supports, bankruptcy relief, and crop insurance were adopted to reduce the financial vulnerability of affected communities to natural variables such as drought, and to fluctuations in domestic and global agricultural markets. 74 However, as discussed further The federal government also subsidized a large system of dams to store water for irrigation during times of low precipitation in the Great Plains. 75 Widespread use of the centrifugal pump to power deep wells and center pivot irrigation systems later allowed farmers to tap into the High Plains aquifer.
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As a result, Great Plains farmers no longer need to rely entirely on precipitation to support millions of farmed acres. Productivity has increased further due to hybrid crops, fertilizers, pesticides, and herbicides. 77 This technologically assisted increase in productivity, however, is not likely to last indefinitely. Groundwater levels in the High Plains aquifer have plummeted, 78 and water demand for crops and livestock will increase with rising temperatures. 79 These factors once again may render the Great Plains vulnerable to drought caused by climate disruption.
Comparison with recent droughts in California
Drought blanketed the United States in 1988, from California to the Northwest, the Northern Rockies, the Upper Midwest, and south to Georgia; but the drought was most pronounced in California and other western states, where it persisted through 1992. 80 Because of improved response capability, a much more diversified economy, and the increased capacity and resilience of water and agricultural infrastructure in California and other parts of the United States, however, both the response to the California drought and its social, economic and human impacts were vastly different than experienced during the Dust Bowl. It would reflect another form of complacency, however, to assume that the same would be true if even longer and more severe droughts occur due to climate disruption.
From a meteorological perspective, the California drought of the late 1980s and early 1990s was as severe as that of the late 1920s and early 1930s, and in some parts of the state is was the worst in the twentieth century.
81 Some sources estimated gross agricultural losses in excess of a half a billion dollars, and increased ratepayer electric costs in the range of three billion dollars. 82 However, the late 1980s and early 1990s California drought did not cause the massive economic, social, and political impacts as 75 82 See GLEICK & NASH, supra note 20 (passim). Other impacts included increased monetary and energy costs to pump and move water, lost hydro-electrical generation and higher costs to replace it (in money and pollution), reduced agricultural income and increased costs to purchase livestock feed and other inputs, millions of dollars in losses due to depleted salmon stocks, declining waterfowl populations, increased forest fires and ensuing damage to property and natural resources, declining tourism and recreation, especially to the ski industry, diminished supplies to municipal users, and weakened natural ecosystems. Id. similar droughts during the Great Depression. The water resources infrastructure developed by the federal and state governments and the private sector since the early twentieth century buffered the region against the full effects of the drought. 83 Because it has a sufficiently sophisticated set of legal and political institutions, California reduced demand through efficiency improvements adopted, encouraged, or required by municipal and agricultural users, and reallocated water among users through water banks and other market tools. 84 Still, by the end of the drought, reserves of both surface water and groundwater had declined, meaning that more serious impacts might have occurred if the drought had continued. California will not likely be able to "store its way" out of the more severe and protracted declines in precipitation and snowpack expected due to climate disruption. 85 Moreover, reservoirs and extensive related water diversions and conveyances cause serious environmental impacts that reduce the health of ecosystems in other ways. 86 The late 1980s and early 1990s California drought was also buffered by the diverse economies of California and other affected states, and by the size, diversity, flexibility, and economic strength of the United States as a whole. Although some economic sectors incurred more harm than others, the economy of the state and the region was better able to withstand the effects of the drought because some sources of jobs and income are relatively less dependent on water than others, and because resulting tax and other revenues could be invested in drought response and relief efforts. 87 Even within California, if the market functions properly, gross income from declining yields can be offset in part by increased crop prices due to declining supplies. 88 Moreover, given the national or international scope of agricultural markets, and the absence of trade barriers and the presence of functional markets within the country, declines in crop yields in one region can be offset by increased production elsewhere, and that in fact happened during the late 1980s and early 1990s drought.
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83 Colorado River water stored in Lake Mead and Lake Powell during the early 1980s offset shortages from other sources, and California's own system of more than 150 major reservoirs provided additional reserves during the early years of the drought. As a result, California farmers did not face reduced water deliveries for at least the first three years of the drought. Additional water stored in aquifers offset declining surface water supplies. 89 See NATIONAL STUDY OF WATER MANAGEMENT DURING DROUGHT, supra note 26, at 14, 22-23. Shifts in regional production cause distributive changes in farm income. However, given that drought strikes different agricultural areas over longer periods of time, temporary distributive effects can even out over time, with each region gaining or losing relative market share during different periods. Moreover, if the locus of agricultural production shifts in the face of regional drought, a country as a whole will not face food shortages and resulting malnutrition. The C.
Summary: Implications for Drought Mitigation in a Disrupted Climate
The nature and characterization of drought suggests several distinct focal points for the analysis of future law and policy. First, viewed from the perspective of meteorological drought, and as Professors David Getches and Janet Neuman have both noted independently, we need to abandon the concept of drought as an aberrational phenomenon, rather than as a regular part of the inherently variable climates of particular regions. 90 That approach encourages maximum use of water during wet periods, leaving little or no resilience to drought during drier periods. Of course, any statistical probability curve has high and low extremes, at increasingly remote levels of probability. Thus, even an approach to water law and policy that considers a range of expected conditions must reflect some policy decision about what extreme conditions should be considered aberrational, that is, beyond the range of probability for which prudent managers should be expected to plan. Moreover, climate change now introduces a considerable amount of additional uncertainty about the range of expected precipitation and other conditions (such as temperature and evaporation rates) that affect water resources supply and demand, and the frequency with which drought conditions should be expected relative to past cycles.
Second, the three effects-based definitions of drought (agricultural drought, hydrologic drought, and socio-economic drought), all of which reflect an imbalance between available water supply and some aspect of human or environmental demand, suggest that drought response must focus on both the supply and demand sides of the equation. Drought relief and response efforts that rely exclusively on financial aid and emergency water supplies will miss important opportunities for drought mitigation, particularly opportunities that can be implemented in advance of drought.
Vulnerability analysis suggests some of the lessons for drought response, but others as well. Societies will be vulnerable to drought if they push the limits of water resources during wet periods, leaving little or no reserve during drought. That will become increasingly important if droughts become more frequent and more severe due to climate disruption, because there will be little or no time for recovery between droughts. Likewise, because wasteful societies will be more vulnerable to drought, future drought prevention and response efforts should focus as much on demand side as on supply side strategies. Vulnerability analysis, however, also suggests that drought policies should focus on broader policies that drive decisions about how much water is used, and for what purposes. Those include government subsidies and insurance policies, as well as the levels of risk deemed appropriate by private financial markets. Further, drought policies might include broader economic and resource-based strategies to prevent and mitigate drought risks, such as restoration of ecosystem components that can buffer drought impacts (including wetlands, floodplains, and other natural water storage areas), economic diversification in drought-prone regions, legal and market institutions to reallocate water and products produced with water, and relief strategies designed to promote self-reliance rather than dependence or risky economic decisions that perpetuate cycles of vulnerability.
ability of farmers in a drought-stricken region to withstand temporary shifts in production and income, however, depends on their overall economic condition and cash and other reserves, or the existence of government risk allocation programs (price supports, crop insurance, or otherwise) to carry them through the crisis. In California, the agricultural sector was strong enough to bear the drought impacts. See GLEICK & NASH, supra note 20, at 39. 90 See, e.g., Getches, supra note 12, at 7 (critiquing water policies that assume "normal" or "average" precipitation); Janet C. Neuman, Drought Proofing Water Law, 7 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 92, 94-96 (2003) (noting that both droughts and floods are just extremes of the spectrum of "normal" or "average" conditions).
III. U.S. WATER, DROUGHT AND AGRICULTURAL LAW IN A DISRUPTED CLIMATE
Water law allocates a scarce resource among competing users and defines rights and interests in that resource according to a predictable set of rules. Thus, it would be logical to assume that water law would have the most influence on the use and allocation of water during times of greatest scarcity, and therefore on behavior and vulnerability during and in anticipation of drought. It is notable, then, that drought experts have referred to existing law as imposing constraints on sound drought management and policy, rather than serving as a beneficial tool. 91 Law governing water allocation during drought poses a balance between compassion and risk because water is essential to lives and livelihoods, but guaranteed water has the potential to encourage waste and thereby to increase vulnerability.
A disconnect arguably exists between water law and drought policy in the United States for several reasons. First, although state water law varies considerably, 92 by and large it addresses drought planning and response as an afterthought. Especially in arid and semi-arid regions of the country most prone to drought, state water law is primarily an instrument of water resource development, 93 and drought policies generally have been tacked on incidentally in response to drought emergencies. Second, to the significant extent that federal law also influences water resources, 94 it also is generally designed to promote resource development rather than sustainable water use and conservation. 95 Third, agriculture is the largest consumptive user of water in the United States except for cooling water for thermoelectric power, especially in areas historically prone to drought. 96 Since the New Deal, federal intervention in agricultural markets, especially for the largest commodity crops, 97 is arguably the dominant factor driving production in the agricultural sector, including decisions affecting water use. 98 Therefore, analysis of U.S. drought law and policy, and changes needed in the face of climate disruption, should focus on both federal and state law, and on agricultural law as well as water law. 99 What is remarkably constant across these areas of law, however, is the tension between the goals of providing drought relief (compassion) and reducing drought vulnerability (risk).
A.
State . 99 Other sectors of the economy, of course, also can have significant water demands. This analysis focuses on agricultural water use and demand because of its predominance in the water economy.
The major doctrines of U.S. water law are not well suited to problems of scarcity. 100 That is ironic because, absent scarcity, "the role of water law is relatively insignificant."
101 As such, the question becomes what, if any, modifications to water law are warranted as a means of adaptation to drought.
State water law and policy
The manner in which water law might address drought can be viewed from two perspectives: (1) the policy question of what goals we want to achieve during drought, and (2) the structural question of what legal means are best suited to achieve those goals? One potential goal of water law is to buffer water users from the adverse impacts of drought, either by enhancing or rationing water supplies or by providing economic compensation or relief. An alternative policy goal, however, is to provide incentives for more water sustainable practices to reduce the frequency and impacts of effects-based drought. Consistent with the thesis of this article, however, those two goals may conflict. The knowledge that government relief is likely during drought can reduce incentives for precautionary measures. Structurally, there are several possible approaches to drought in water law. The first, which I call "drought neutrality," would maintain uniform rules of water law regardless of the balance between water supply and demand at any given time, i.e., any separate body of "drought law" would not modify the general rules of water law. Indeed, if water law is significant mainly in times of scarcity, and if the background system of water law is modified significantly for those conditions, the exceptions would become the most important rule. In theory, under a "drought neutral" approach stable legal rules would allow the market to allocate water in scarcity as well as abundance, while providing incentives to use water efficiently. As such, there would be no need for special drought allocation rules. Water users would make risk decisions on the basis of the background legal regime and have an incentive to use market mechanisms to reallocate water more efficiently. 102 In theory, those with preferred rights would have an incentive to use water more efficiently so they would have more rights to sell during shortages. Those with less preferred legal rights would also have an incentive to conserve to avoid unnecessary purchase costs. Over time these incentives might prompt rational parties to engage in more sustainable water practices in advance, rather than waiting for a drought to occur. Various aspects of U.S. water law, however, impose barriers to efficient marketing of water rights. 103 As a result, "winners" under the prevailing legal regimes do not necessarily have significant incentive to conserve.
The second approach, which I will refer to as "drought exceptionalism," is to modify the usual rules of water law during periods of drought in order to provide relief to affected users or to allocate the risk of loss in a manner that differs from what would occur under non-drought conditions. A threshold question regarding drought exceptionalism is how to define the exception, that is, how to establish the conditions under which background rules are modified or under which some form of relief is provided. 100 That obviously relates to the problems of drought definition discussed in Part II.A, supra. If there is no clear ex ante definition of drought, water users have insufficient signals by which to gauge their conduct, or to assess the real risk of loss under various conditions. If a water law regime triggers special drought provisions too readily, the background rules become largely irrelevant, as suggested above, and users have little incentive to take actions to prevent or otherwise to provide for shortages.
The third and most common approach to drought in water law is, for want of a better term, ad hoc. This approach responds to individual droughts with specific changes that either remain embedded in the background system of water law or expire when the emergency ends, or is perceived to have ended. That approach has the benefit of flexibility because water law modifications and relief provisions can be tailored to variable drought conditions and impacts. Different impacts on human and environmental water uses might suggest different legal and policy responses. An ad hoc approach leaves water users with less clear signals by which to assess risk. Ironically, however, compared to a system of drought exceptionalism that has hairpin triggers for government relief, that very uncertainty might increase incentives to engage in preventive or sustainable behavior. If government establishes a pattern of frequent or inevitable relief, incentives will evaporate even if the precise nature of relief varies.
The system of riparian rights prevalent in the East generally assumes abundant supplies that can be divided equitably among competing users, so long as uses are reasonable and do not interfere unduly with the rights of other users. 104 Pure riparian rights systems, in theory, allocate scarce water among competing users according to equitable factors, requiring everyone to share in the risk of scarcity.
105 So long as each user retains enough water to continue economically viable uses at some level, that result might work. However, if the resulting cutbacks leave all (or most) users below the minimum level necessary to remain viable, the perverse result is all losers and no winners. 106 Even under common law administration of riparian rights, however, courts often established de facto preferences among users, but without statutory guidance on how to make such choices, and with an apparent preference for large water users. 107 Moreover, especially under emergency conditions, it is extremely inefficient to address shortages via case-by-case litigation. The uncertainty and instability inherent in case-by-case allocation leaves large water users, who typically receive judicial protection, with little incentive to engage in more sustainable practices. Under more recent statutory and administrative systems of riparian rights, statutory preferences operate much as they might in prior appropriation states, and with the same weak incentives for conservation. 108 The administrative process, however, allows allocation decisions to be made more efficiently and before use, rather than in a post hoc dispute. 109 An administrative system also allows agencies to impose efficiency requirements as a condition of water use permits.
Under the prior appropriation doctrine that prevails in the arid West, rights are assigned according to priority of use. 110 Thus, because senior appropriators are entitled to their full apportionment before juniors receive any water, the system avoids the "everyone loses" problem.
111
Under that system, however, "winners" have little incentive to conserve until water is so scarce that they, too, face shortages. In theory, prior appropriation incorporates a prohibition against waste (inefficiency) and limits water rights to "beneficial use," defined in part by reference to the amount of water reasonably necessary to support the intended use. 112 In practice, however, those tenets of prior appropriation law have been enforced weakly at best. 113 Moreover, although prior appropriation may allocate scarce water more efficiently in drought than is true under riparian rights, it does so in ways that tend to embed historic uses at the expense of economic efficiency or other societal preferences. Impediments to water marketing have limited its effectiveness in reallocating scarce water to uses that are either economically or environmentally more valuable. 114 Finally, because abundant storage and conveyance systems have buffered arid western states from significant problems of scarcity thus far, that system has not yet been tested extensively in times of extreme drought.
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Neither riparian rights nor prior appropriation, therefore, provide significant incentives for efficiency improvements designed to reduce drought vulnerability. The next question is whether states have modified those legal regimes in ways that do so, or whether they focus more on short-term relief.
State drought law and policy
In many state water law systems, drought is not addressed as a distinct concept ("drought neutrality"). Professor Robert Beck's classic two-volume treatise on water law addresses the topic of drought only rarely, and even then as an adjunct to other topics. 116 State water law is not, however, entirely drought neutral. There are notable exceptions in the law of some U.S. states in which water rights and obligations can be modified in the event of drought, or which provide for other responses to drought conditions. 117 To one degree or another, these special drought provisions face the tension between compassion and risk, and therefore have the potential to affect drought vulnerability.
The closest thing to a universal state response to drought is contingency planning, sometimes as a requirement of state law. 118 121 That work recommends that drought planning focus on advance mitigation to reduce vulnerability 122 as well as monitoring, prediction, response and relief during droughts. 123 It also notes that providing compensation without regard to whether preventive measures had been taken provides a disincentive to mitigation.
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Drought mitigation plans alone, however, do not ensure a risk reduction approach, as opposed to one that focuses on providing relief when droughts occur. Many current state plans continue to focus largely on response, and only a few have shifted to mitigation and prevention to reduce vulnerability. 125 The content of state drought response plans, of course, must reflect the relevant substantive aspects of state laws and regulations, which vary considerably in the manner in which they balance the goals of drought relief and risk reduction. There are legitimate reasons why state drought plans and legal provisions should vary due to differences in climate, hydrology, economics, population, and other 128 Some states define drought by statute or regulation, but without sufficient specificity to provide a clear signal to water users or to reflect a considered policy judgment about when relief or other responses are appropriate. 129 Other states are more specific in defining drought. Kansas requires water providers to develop adequate water supplies to meet needs during a drought with a two percent probability of occurrence.
130 Although experts might quibble with technical aspects of this definition, and although it might have to be re-evaluated if conditions change due to climate disruption, it provides some signal regarding the probability and severity of conditions considered to constitute drought. However, even this definition is designed for water resources management planning, and not necessarily to trigger financial or other drought relief.
The absence or vagueness of statutory or regulatory triggers for drought relief and response has some advantages, because it provides flexibility to address a range of different drought timing and conditions. For example, a short, intense period of low precipitation might warrant different responses than a longer, less severe reduction in precipitation. However, leaving the declaration of drought .116(I) (providing for sequence of "drought watch," "drought warning," "drought emergency," and "drought disaster" based on a drought forecasting plan tied to "indicators such as precipitation deficits, surface and groundwater levels, reservoir storage, and soil moisture"); 4 PA. CODE § 112.3 (regulation defining disasters as including drought and other catastrophes that "results in damage to property, hardship, suffering or possible loss of life"); TEX. [GOVT.] CODE ANN. § 418.014 (authorizing Texas Governor to declare a drought disaster, but specifying qualifying conditions for drought). 130 KAN. STAT. ANN. § § 82a-928 (municipal water supplies), 82a-1303 (state conservation storage supply). Likewise, private water rights applicants must prove capacity for beneficial use during a drought with a two percent probability of occurrence. Id. § 82a-1304. The statutory standard is specified by regulation as a drought having a statistical chance of occurring once every fifty years, on average, which the state assumes is equivalent to conditions measured in the drought record from 1952-57. See KAN. ADMIN. REGS. § § 98-5-1, 98-5-01, 98-5-8.
entirely to the discretion of the Governor or other state officials on an ad hoc basis can cause decisions about when to provide drought relief, or to trigger conservation or other mitigation requirements, to be based on political considerations rather than a policy determination of what will result in the most appropriate balance between short-term drought relief and long-term risk reduction.
It would be preferable for state statute or regulations to establish explicit standards dictating when drought relief or response measures are appropriate. Such standards would signal water users about the conditions under which relief will be provided, thus encouraging prevention-oriented risk decisions. Stricter triggers for relief will place users at greater risk of loss, but will encourage sustainable practices to reduce vulnerability. For example, states might borrow from policies adopted in Australia in 1992 to encourage agricultural practices appropriate to regional climate and hydrology.
131 Drought legislation could require farmers and other water users to plan for the "normal" range of meteorological conditions rather than providing relief whenever precipitation falls below "average". Legislators or other decision makers would have to make tough decisions about what range within the regional precipitation probability curve should define extraordinary conditions beyond which prudent businesses should be expected to plan. If precipitation patterns shift as much as has been predicted due to climate change, however, making those decisions will become increasingly complex. Moreover, to effectuate the desired policy goal, state legislatures and regulatory officials need to exercise restraint in the face of specific drought emergencies, and to avoid pressure from affected interest groups to provide ad hoc financial or regulatory relief that minimizes the effectiveness of the intended incentives.
A second centerpiece of many state drought statutes is funding for drought relief. Although state drought relief funding is miniscule compared to the massive amount of federal drought relief, 132 it is the most obvious example of programs for which the balance between compassion and risk is particularly challenging. Many states provide for open-ended or vaguely defined financial relief to various categories of drought victims, 133 sometimes through tax or regulatory relief, 134 or relief from private sector economic consequences 135 rather than direct payments. Other states, however, fund projects designed to prevent or reduce drought impacts. 136 Unconditioned, easily triggered financial 131 Australia decided that providing relief under what might be referred to as conditions of "normal" aridity in a given region encouraged unsustainable farming practices, and that relief should be provided only for conditions that a prudent farmer could not have reasonably predicted. The policy was modified over time in response to later droughts to provide relief payments in "exceptional circumstances," a standard that proved difficult and somewhat arbitrary to administer absent more precise criteria. relief is more likely to reduce drought impacts to individuals and businesses, but provides few incentives to reduce vulnerability. Either stingier financial relief programs, stricter (or at least clearer) definitions of drought to trigger relief, or programs conditioned on advance prevention and mitigation are more likely to promote drought risk reduction. Likewise, spending money to augment water supplies or otherwise to reduce drought severity once drought begins is likely to reduce human and economic suffering; but pre-drought investments to reduce water demand are more likely to reduce long-term vulnerability.
There has been some trend toward increased use of mitigation in state drought plans. 137 One mitigation strategy is temporary reallocation of water rights or suspension or limitation of withdrawal privileges during drought. Some states, for example, restrict or prohibit water withdrawals during declared droughts. 138 Others move in the opposite direction by authorizing emergency withdrawal permits or alternative supply sources to augment supplies during drought, 139 and some increase the flexibility of water users to engage in willing transfers of water rights during droughts. 140 States also vary in their philosophies about whether drought-related shortages should be borne equally among users or should reflect policy-based use priorities. Texas, for example, requires pro rata reductions during drought, i.e., no preference among users. 141 Iowa, by contrast, provides a statutory hierarchy for allocating water during drought, enforced through sequential prohibitions on water uses by category, 142 while Pennsylvania has the authority to prohibit nonessential water use during droughts. 143 The choice among different approaches to modifying water rights reflects competing policy goals, but with implications for the resulting balance between compassion and risk. For example, provisions that facilitate water transfers provide incentives to use water more efficiently to free up a saleable commodity, while simultaneously allocating water more efficiently in times of scarcity. A drought neutral approach in which shortages are borne pro rata operates like the traditional riparian rights system, 144 in which users presumably have an incentive to conserve if sufficient supplies remain to support uses, but with considerable uncertainty depending on the length and severity of the resulting cutbacks. Use-based reductions operate like the seniority system in the prior appropriation doctrine. 145 High priority uses have few incentives to save because they will get their share under all but the most severe conditions, and low priority uses have little incentive to save because their uses are likely to be eliminated first. Unlike the prior appropriation doctrine, however, use priorities based on legislative judgments at least reflect a policy judgment as to which water uses are most important during drought.
A second common mitigation strategy is to require or encourage water suppliers or users to prepare and implement drought emergency plans or water conservation plans as a condition of state water rights or water use permits. 146 To some extent, such strategies shift key decisions about balancing relief and risk reduction "downstream" to water providers and users, and the nature of that balance may depend on the strategies chosen. States may require water users and providers to identify or to implement water conservation or other use reduction methods, 147 or to plan for alternative or augmented water supplies.
148 Such strategies are inherently designed to reduce drought vulnerability.
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B.
Federal Water and Drought Law and Policy
Federal water law and policy
Because water resources allocation in the United States is left largely to the states, 150 there is no single, coherent body of federal water law. There is, however, a long history of federal investment and water project construction that drives water resources development, especially in the West and the Midwest. In addition, various sources of federal law govern water rights and allocation for particular parties or in specific geographic locations. Although none of those sources of federal water law is directed at drought per se, some have drought-specific provisions, and each has varying degrees of influence on the balance between compassion and risk in federal, state, and private drought response. 154 Statutes governing federal water project construction or licensing do not establish federal drought policy per se. At most, they articulate general principles of water resource management, 155 with delegation of authority over project management to federal program officials. Moreover, Congress has consistently subjected implementation of those federal laws to applicable state water law, 156 except where state law conflicts with an express requirement of the federal statute. 157 In that sense, federal water resource development statutes could be viewed as drought neutral: the federal role is simply to provide or facilitate water infrastructure, with key decisions about water and drought left to state law.
a. Federal water resource development statutes and programs
However, federal decisions about project funding, approval and operation can have significant impacts on drought management and impacts. Federally built or licensed water projects provide significant storage capacity that helps buffer regions from the effects of meteorological drought, thus reducing vulnerability. On the other hand, that infrastructure arguably stimulates water use in regions with limited water supply, particularly when federal subsidies distort decisions about the economic benefits and risks of water use. 158 Irrigation confers significant benefits in terms of food production, 159 and water storage and conveyance supports urban growth and development in regions where many people want to live. 160 However, artificially high water use can increase vulnerability if reservoir storage runs short during a protracted drought, especially if climate disruption reduces precipitation beyond the range assumed when projects were built, for example in the Colorado River Basin. 161 Decisions about additional storage capacity to deal with future drought will either be made by federal agencies, or will be subject to federal licensing or permitting. 162 Moreover, the federal role does not end once water projects are built. Despite the fact that federal water project operation is typically subject to state water law and therefore requires acquisition of state water rights, 163 federal officials make key decisions about use and allocation of federal project water, 164 including in droughts.
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Federal decisions regarding water project construction and operation are also subject to federal environmental statutes, which may also play a role in drought policy. For example, federal decisions about dam construction, operation and management may be subject to the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). 166 If an environmental impact statement (EIS) is required, the agency must study and reveal reasonably foreseeable environmental project impacts, alternatives to the action and comparative impacts, and potential mitigation. 167 The Endangered Species Act 168 may have an even greater impact on drought response where section 7 consultation 169 requires water from federal projects to be devoted to species and habitat protection rather than irrigation, municipal or industrial water supply, or other off stream human uses during drought.
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Because federal water project decisions are subject to discretion by different agencies within highly variable contexts, it is difficult to discern a uniform "policy" about how they affect drought management. However, both NEPA and the ESA require agencies to evaluate alternatives that might minimize impacts on the environment or on threatened or endangered species and their habitat. 171 See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)(iii), 40 C.F.R. §1502.14 (requiring agencies in an EIS to evaluate alternatives to the proposed action); 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(3)(A) (requiring consideration of "reasonable and prudent alternatives" that would not jeopardize species and their habitat).
analysis provides the informational framework and legal support for agencies to choose between competing drought management strategies and goals. Stored federal project water might be used to provide drought relief to users who might otherwise have to curtail their uses and activities, which might encourage inefficiency in the long run. Alternatively, agencies might reduce vulnerability by conditioning water availability on implementation of water efficiency measures. 172 An often-overlooked requirement of NEPA is for agencies to consider "the relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity." 173 An approach that exalts short-term uses might focus on immediate drought relief, whereas one that focuses more on long-term productivity might promote efforts to reduce vulnerability.
One example is the Bureau of Reclamation's guidelines governing operation of Glen Canyon and Hoover Dams given current and predicted shortages in the Colorado River Basin. 174 Guided by an EIS process 175 and a negotiated agreement by the Colorado River Basin States, 176 the "interim" guidelines 177 specify reservoir elevations for Lake Powell and Lake Mead that will dictate prescribed water delivery reductions. However, the guidelines also encourage water conservation and allow storage of the resulting savings in the reservoirs free from the "use it or lose it" provisions of prior appropriation. 178 Two aspects of the guidelines stand out as examples of mechanisms that can motivate risk reduction while still providing for some relief in the event of severe drought. First, by providing quantitative clarity regarding reservoir levels at which specified reductions will occur, the guidelines establish clear signals by which water users can make decisions about water use and efficiency. Second, rather than simply providing "free" water from federal storage in the event of drought, the provisions tie drought relief to earlier efforts to generate surplus through conservation or augmentation of water supplies.
b. Federal law governing water rights and allocation
There is also no integrated body of federal law governing water rights and allocation by which to guide federal drought policy. However, several sources of federal law affect water rights in specific applications. Those include the federal reserved water rights doctrine governing Indian reservations and other reserved federal lands, 180 and federal statutes, 181 Congressionally approved interstate compacts and U.S. Supreme Court decisions and decrees 183 governing allocation of specific interstate waters. 184 By and large, federal law either protects federal property or resource interests, or fulfills the federal role in resolving interstate water disputes. To the extent that these goals are independent of drought policy, this piecemeal body of federal water law is drought neutral. However, given that federal intervention into state water allocation decisions has the greatest significance during times of scarcity, 185 federal water law can affect the balance between relief-based or risk reduction approaches to drought.
i. Federal reserved water rights
The federal reserved water rights doctrine casts a "cloud" over the state prior appropriation doctrine, 186 with an uncertain impact on the manner in which other water users perceive and respond to drought risk. Federal reserved water rights consist of water that the federal government, pursuant to its authority under the Commerce Clause 187 and the Property Clause, 188 impliedly reserved to support the uses for which particular federal lands were set aside from the general public domain. 189 Because the priority date for federal reserved rights is based on the date the reservation was established, 190 in a large percentage of cases those rights would have priority over other uses under the "first in time, first in right" tenet of the prior appropriation doctrine. 191 Moreover, federal reserved rights are not subject to the "use it or lose it" requirement of prior appropriation law. 192 A large percentage of federal reserved rights have not been quantified; they might be quite substantial relative to other uses and water rights; and they may either not be in actual use or might consist of instream uses that are not transparent to other users absent a legal claim of priority.
In theory, uncertainties in federal reserved rights could cause other water users to exercise caution about inefficient water use for fear that those uses would be reduced or eliminated by senior reserved rights during a drought. Reality, however, is undoubtedly different, and this potential efficiency incentive is counter-balanced by incentives in the prior appropriation doctrine. Given the tendency toward complacency during times of plenty, water users are more likely to use as much of the resource as they can absent an actual challenge. Moreover, because users are subject to statutory forfeiture or common law abandonment if they do not use their full appropriative rights, 193 and because the prohibition against waste is enforced ineffectively at best, 194 prior appropriation doctrine prevents the latent pendency of federal reserved rights from serving as a significant incentive for efficiency. This dynamic might shift if the federal and state governments improved or expedited efforts to quantify federal reserved water rights through general stream adjudications, 195 statutory settlements, or otherwise. Although the "use it or lose it" mentality of non-federal water users would likely persist even in the face of quantification when resources are sufficient, at least those users would be on notice of the risks they face when supplies diminish during droughts of various magnitudes.
Federal reserved water rights also provide mixed incentives for risk reduction by federal water users. Federal reserved rights are quantified relative to the amount of water necessary to fulfill the primary purpose of the reservation. 196 Quantification based entirely on demand, rather than balancing supply and demand under a range of hydrological circumstances, provides incentives for federal users to overstate their needs to maximize their quantified water rights. However, the Supreme Court has curtailed this tendency somewhat by clarifying that the doctrine "reserves only that amount of water necessary to fulfill the purpose of the reservation, no more."
197 Non-federal water users will argue that this standard demands that federal users base their claims on efficient methods of water use. Ironically, however, it is difficult for non-federal users to argue that federal claimants must be more efficient than they are. Efforts to reconcile inchoate federal reserved rights with existing water rights and uses could force all users to evaluate efficiency improvements that might reduced drought vulnerability overall.
ii. Federal resolution of interstate water disputes
A range of legal tools is used to resolve interstate water conflicts by varying institutions, at different times, and to address different issues. Therefore, they are not likely to reflect a coherent or consistent drought policy. Those resolutions are likely to be drought neutral if they simply allocate water among competing users regardless of hydrological conditions. However, federal intervention in interstate water disputes can provide positive or negative incentives for reducing drought vulnerability.
The law of equitable apportionment, under which the U.S. Supreme Court resolves interstate water disputes 198 absent a compact or other direct agreement, has the potential to stimulate efforts to reduce drought vulnerability, but the Court's infrequent and tepid application of the doctrine have minimized that potential thus far. In deciding apportionment among states, the Court considers, among other factors, "the practical effect of wasteful uses on downstream areas." 199 Moreover, while priority is the "guiding principle" in interstate allocation disputes between two prior appropriation states, the Court considers other factors such as available conservation methods and the balance of harms between states. 200 In theory, judicial inquiry into the efficiency of water use by competing states should provide incentives for efforts to improve efficiency and hence to reduce drought vulnerability.
Unfortunately, two aspects of the Court's equitable apportionment jurisprudence have limited the effectiveness of this incentive. First, the Court has declined to resolve interstate water disputes absent interstate impacts of a "serious magnitude." 201 This reflects the Court's reluctance to interfere with state control over water resources and perhaps an intentional judicial incentive for states to resolve water disputes through negotiation rather than litigation. However, the effect is to defer key decisions until impacts have already occurred, rather than adopting or requiring preventive measures to reduce risk. Second, the Court declined to provide relief in the most significant case in which it actually examined water efficiency in an equitable apportionment case. Overruling findings by a Special Master, the Supreme Court held that Colorado did not meet a strict "clear and convincing evidence" standard to prove inefficient water use in New Mexico.
202 Arguably the Court simply followed the reluctance of western states to curtail traditional existing water uses in determining waste or inefficiency. But the Supreme Court's weak scrutiny provides little incentive for states to promote sustainable water use and management to reduce drought vulnerability for themselves and for neighboring states. 203 Interstate water compacts are not likely to reflect a considered federal drought policy because, despite requiring Congressional approval, 204 the compacts more likely reflect interstate negotiation than federal policy. Congress has no incentive to disturb those judgments absent an inappropriate impact on non-signatory states or countervailing federal interests. 205 Some interstate water compacts reflect a largely drought neutral approach, i.e., they might envision drought, and even allocate the risk of drought among the party states, but leave decisions about resulting shortages either to individual states within the apportionments negotiated in the agreement, or to future resolution. The Colorado River Compact, for example, assigns the risk of drought to the Upper Basin. 206 Although it apportions fixed rights to beneficial consumptive use between the Upper and Lower Basins, 207 the Compact obligates the states primarily situated in the Upper Basin (the "Upper Division" 208 full apportionment on a ten-year rolling average, 209 thus placing any risk of loss on the Upper Basin. This allocation of drought risk reflected a quid pro quo in return for which the Upper Division states were freed from enforcement of the prior appropriation doctrine given far more rapid growth in the Lower Basin, especially California. 210 The potentially perverse result is that the Upper Division states have far greater incentives that the Lower Division states to reduce drought vulnerability. On the other hand, the tension created within the Compact, and perhaps aversion to expensive and protracted litigation that would be required for the Lower Division to enforce its Compact rights against the Upper Division, generated sufficient incentives for the states and the federal government to negotiate the interim shortage guidelines discussed earlier. 211 Other interstate compacts, notably the Delaware River Basin Compact 212 and the Susquehanna River Basin Compact, 213 address drought management more directly but without significant guidance. The Delaware Compact establishes the interstate Delaware River Basin Commission (DRBC), 214 which has authority to allocate basin waters equitably and proportionally 215 and unusually broad authority over basin water management generally. 216 As part of this authority, the Commission has the power to declare drought emergencies and accompanying increases or decreases in water allocations, diversions, or releases as necessary to address drought conditions. 217 However, aside from public hearing requirements, 218 the Compact provides no definition of what constitutes a drought or requirements regarding how the Commission's drought emergency powers should be exercised.
Some commentators argue that this bare bones approach is the compact's strength because of its "flexible, cooperative, planning-oriented structure," 219 while others suggest that the approach is designed to leave drought management largely to member states "as long as the state agency acts consistently with commission drought management plans." 220 An alternative view is that the states entrusted drought and water management decisions to the Commission because its composition fully represents and protects each state's interests, 221 although the process has seen controversy and threats of additional litigation. 222 Regardless of the explanation, the Commission has adopted risk reduction strategies for drought in two key respects. First, the Commission has defined the "drought of record" to provide notice about what will trigger a drought emergency and what should be used for dependable water supply planning, 223 as well as phased reductions tied to particular conditions and geographic areas, and accompanying priorities for use reductions. 224 Second, to reduce drought vulnerability in advance, the Commission requires water users to maximize efficiency and to adopt and implement water conservation plans and contingency plans to further reduce freshwater use during droughts. 225 The comprehensive, interstate commission approach to water management in the Delaware and Susquehanna River Basin Compacts reflects a rare application of regional, watershed-based river and water management that was advocated for many years in the United States, and reflected most clearly in the Water Resources Planning Act of 1965, 226 but that has been abandoned as a nationwide initiative. 227 The Delaware River Basin experience and the Colorado River drought shortage guidelines suggest that cooperative approaches to resolving interstate water disputes provide opportunities to reduce drought vulnerability through advance planning and management. By comparison, waiting to resolve those disputes once droughts occur, through litigation or otherwise, is likely to generate reactive rather than preventive drought policies. It would be wise to develop similar institutions in advance in other parts of the country that are likely to face increased drought risk due to climate disruption.
2.
Federal drought and agricultural law and policy
Just as states have adopted drought legislation to augment state water law, the federal government has adopted drought laws and policies independent of federal water law and policy, or integrated into that law and policy only to a limited degree. Conversely, federal drought law and policy is linked very closely to U.S. agricultural law and policy. The manner in which the federal government has addressed tradeoffs between drought relief and risk reduction, therefore, can best be understood in the context of the historical co-evolution of federal drought and agricultural law. a.
Federal Laissez Faire Policy before the New Deal
Until the 1930s, drought and other disaster relief was left to nongovernmental organizations, and those who made unsound risk decisions that could not be remedied through the private market went bankrupt and moved to other places in search of new livelihoods. 228 In 1887, President Grover Cleveland vetoed federal legislation appropriating $10,000 to provide seeds to drought-stricken Texas as unconstitutional, asserting: "Though the people support the government, the government should not support the people." 229 Under this laissez faire philosophy, only farmers who made sound risk decisions (what crops to plant, when, and where; and how much to borrow for mortgages, equipment and supplies) continued to operate. However, this approach resulted in significant human suffering and economic dislocation due to extremely high bankruptcy and foreclosure rates in the Great Plains and elsewhere. 230 Farmers who settled areas with unpredictable weather took risks to feed and clothe the nation but bore the full consequences of that risk when the weather and the economy turned bad.
The first significant federal drought relief came during World War I, but remained focused on self-sufficiency. In both 1918 and 1919, President Wilson authorized one million dollars for seed loans to farmers who lost two successive crops to drought and winter frosts. 231 Although farm organizations sought more significant federal assistance during the 1920s, legislation either failed in Congress or was vetoed. 232 President Hoover first sought relief from private organizations, 233 and in 1930 approved federal aid only of a "self-help" variety such as crop production and feed and seed loans secured only by a first lien on the crops produced. 234 Although the Secretary of Agriculture had sole discretion to determine when drought relief was warranted, funding was so low that farmer risk decisions could be subsidized only in extreme situations. Moreover, the 1930 Act provided loans rather than grants or relief payments. While helpful to farmers who lacked sufficient capital reserves when revenues from droughtstricken crops fell, repayment requirements still required farmers to internalize the risk of planting a new crop if drought conditions remained. However, the federal government subsidized those risk decisions by limiting the required loan security to a first lien on the crops grown. Drought exacerbated but was not the only source of volatility in production and prices in an inherently risky sector of the economy. Perhaps as a result, the "'self-help' approach used by the Hoover administration represents the last attempt by a U.S. President to address drought relief problems through voluntary measures." 235 
b. The New Deal Legacy of Compassion and Risk Spreading
As the drought and the depression intensified, and prompted by the substantially different philosophy of the Franklin Delano Roosevelt Administration, the United States abandoned its laissez faire approach to drought. Instead, the federal government distributed the risk of drought across society through programs designed to provide emergency response and relief. 236 Those measures included government funding or other assistance for supplemental water supply, subsidized feed or other agricultural inputs, subsidized crop insurance, and direct relief payments. 237 New Deal agricultural policies also responded to underlying problems in agricultural markets, which were exacerbated but not caused by drought. During World War I, the government encouraged farmers to produce as much as possible to meet international market demand generated by reduced production in war-torn regions. 238 When those markets declined after the war, U.S. farmers continued to produce in record quantities, resulting in surpluses, plummeting market prices, and insufficient farm revenues to meet debt service and other needs. 239 The main purpose of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 240 was to restore balance between agricultural supply and demand, and sufficient prices to restore the purchasing power of producers of agricultural commodities 241 relative to a base period immediately prior to World War I. 242 To balance supply and demand, the federal government paid farmers to produce less, and used proceeds from commodity processing taxes to maintain prices and to purchase surplus commodities to control supply. 243 This reduced incentives for debt-laden farmers to till more and more acreage, potentially on marginal soils, to maximize revenue despite unfavorable conditions. 244 However, guaranteed federal payments also reduced the incentive for farmers to reevaluate the risk of continuing production in drought-stricken regions.
Congress did not originally intend this unprecedented federal intervention into agricultural markets to continue beyond the Great Depression. 245 But as the drought of the 1930s intensified, leading to the intense human suffering of the Dust Bowl, 247 Congress continued to respond with massive emergency funding for disaster loans and other relief programs. 248 Following the 1936 Supreme Court decision in United States v. Butler, which invalidated the tax provisions of the 1933 Act, 249 Congress modified its intervention into the agricultural economy in the Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act of 1936. 250 The 1936 Act established a precedent for using agricultural law to protect soil, water and other environmental resources while also continuing efforts to control excess production by removing acreage from production. 251 Unlike its initial, temporary intervention into the agricultural economy, however, Congress established long-term institutions to implement the 1936 Act, 252 and linked the soil conservation program to the Agricultural Adjustment Act. 253 Moreover, the soil conservation law directed the Secretary of Agriculture to expand domestic and foreign markets and to dispose of surplus commodities. 254 These linkages made it difficult to decouple federal agricultural and conservation policy.
The Soil Conservation Act failed to curtail production sufficiently to maintain prices, 255 leading Congress to pass the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938. 256 The 1938 Act blended the loan-based parity concept of the 1933 Act with the direct grant approach in the 1936 soil and water conservation law, 257 and added what would become a longstanding program of federal crop insurance. The new law employed marketing quotas and commodity reserve storage to help achieve supply and parity price goals. Along with the Agricultural Act of 1949, 258 the 1938 Act remains the "default" policy absent periodic agricultural legislation ("farm bills") that override those provisions during specific periods. 259 Several aspects of these new laws affect the balance between drought relief and risk reduction.
The 1938 Act provided that soil conservation grants in "arid or semiarid" regions (a term not defined in the statute) may include "water conservation and the beneficial use of water on individual farms…." 260 Although designed to promote efficient water use, these grants facilitated investment in water storage and irrigation to develop agriculture in regions that otherwise could not support it. Although consistent with the Reclamation Act philosophy, this sent mixed signals about the risks of operating in arid regions. Congress also directed the Secretary of Agriculture to apportion funds based on acreage planted over the preceding decade, adjusted for "abnormal weather conditions and trends in acreage during the applicable period." 261 This provided incentives to plant during unfavorable weather. Payments were allotted based on the history of acreage seeded rather than crop yield, making productivity less relevant than total acreage for purposes of grant payments, and hence decisions about planting risk in dry years. Similarly, because base production was adjusted to account for abnormal weather, farmers could continue to plant in dry years without fear of reduced future payments.
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The 1938 Act continued the parity philosophy of the 1933 Act, but through loans and direct parity payments. 263 The new Commodity Credit Corporation administered the loans, which like those adopted during the Hoover Administration were secured entirely by the crops. 264 Those became known as "non-recourse loans" because the government had no recourse on default other than selling the crops pledged as collateral. This allowed producers to sell their crops, repay their loans, and retain the difference as profit; or if market prices were low to repay the loan with the crops pledged as collateral. Adding to that risk subsidy, the Secretary of Agriculture compensated producers for the difference between actual receipts and expected parity prices. 265 Because parity payments were "in addition to and not in substitution for any other payments authorized by law," 266 a producer could receive, for the same crop, direct conservation grants, loans subsidized only by the crops produced, and parity payments. In the aggregate, these programs significantly lowered the risk to farmers of planting during droughts.
The Act also established an elaborate system of marketing quotas for the five major commodity crops (tobacco, corn, wheat, cotton, and rice). To prevent the indiscriminate dumping of commodities on the market, which depressed prices and the agricultural economy generally, Congress directed the Secretary to set quotas when supplies exceeded prescribed amounts deemed "abnormally excessive." 267 Congress explained that government quotas were necessary given production volatility due to "natural causes" (including drought) and the inability of large numbers of diversely located farmers to organize sufficiently to limit production. 268 In calculating quotas, however, drought and other natural causes were taken into account in two converse ways. First, "normal yield" was adjusted to account for "abnormal weather conditions," and years in which yields were reduced significantly were deleted. 269 Second, in calculating "reserve supply levels," increments were added to guard against shortages caused by droughts, floods or other conditions. 270 Thus, although Congress authorized quotas to prevent a tragedy of the commons phenomenon in which individual farmers increased production at the expense of market balance, the effect was to reduce the degree to which farmers considered the risk of drought.
Finally, Congress established a new program of agricultural insurance through which the government assumed risks that the private insurance market deemed imprudent. 271 The law authorized FCIC to insure wheat producers 272 "against loss in yields of wheat due to unavoidable causes, including drought ... [and other] unavoidable causes…."
273 Because of federal capitalization and the lack of private shareholders, federal crop insurance conferred subsidies compared to the private market, if private crop insurance was available at all. Moreover, because the law did not define "drought", payments were not limited to extreme conditions, leaving the magnitude of the subsidy to FCIC discretion. However, the program required farmers to base planting decisions on drought risk in some respects. The Act prohibited coverage of "losses due to the negligence or malfeasance of the producer or to the failure of the producer to reseed in areas and under circumstances where it is customary to reseed." 274 Insurance was limited to between fifty and seventy-five percent of the average yield of wheat on the farm for a representative base period, leaving a quarter to a half of the crop either uninsured or to the private insurance market. 275 Finally, the statute required premiums to be "fair and just," and mandated that the corporation's capital stock could only be restored "out of operating profits of the Corporation."
276 Thus, presumably premiums had to suffice to meet expected payout obligations.
Compassion was one justification for New Deal intervention into U.S. agricultural markets. Congress reallocated risk to society at large from those whose livelihoods were disrupted by factors perceived to be beyond their control (such as drought). That rationale, of course, was the premise for broader social support mechanisms adopted in the United States during the 1930s.
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Several related economic rationales, however, also justified drought relief and other New Deal agricultural policies. When large numbers of farms or other businesses fail or decline in profitability due to drought or other unpredictable causes, secondary economic impacts to surrounding communities can be significant. 278 Drought relief rehabilitated regional economies, not simply individual farmers. Moreover, to the extent that farmers produce basic life support products, arguably they assume the risk of drought on behalf of society. Although all businesses incur risks, society arguably has a greater 269 See id. §301(13) . 270 See id. §301(14. 271 The Federal Crop Insurance Corporation ("FCIC") administered this program. See id. §503. 272 Congress initially limited federal crop insurance to wheat because of widespread failures of that crop during the droughts of the 1930s, see id. §502, but later added other commodities. 273 Id. §508(a). 274 Id. 275 Id. 276 Id. §504(a). 277 See BRANDS, supra note 229, at 297-298 (discussing federal measures during opening days of Roosevelt Administration to alleviate the human consequences of bank failures, as alternative to free market approach); Opie, supra note 10, at 250. 278 During the Dust Bowl, drought impacts extended far beyond the boundaries of the farm to the entire banking, real estate, and financial infrastructure of affected regions. See supra Part II.B.1. interest in ensuring the continued supply of food and other life support commodities. Moreover, businesses that face climate uncertainties incur significant risk beyond what is typical for many other businesses. A laissez faire approach requires farmers to internalize that risk just like any other business. But weather and climate risk may be less amenable to prediction than other forms of business risk, and that uncertainty will increase due to climate disruption. In addition, the federal government intervened in agricultural markets because producers were not responding effectively to imbalances between supply and demand. Even in the face of declining demand and prices, individual farmers maintained or expanded production to augment earnings and to meet debt obligations. 279 Overproduction exacerbated the economic crisis by flooding the market when prices were already low, but it also damaged soil, water, and other resources, thus increasing vulnerability to drought.
Viewed solely from the perspective of drought policy, New Deal programs sent mixed messages to farmers. By abandoning the laissez faire approach, the new policies injected significant distortion into the agricultural economy in ways that reduced incentives to avoid farming in drought-prone regions, or to do so in sustainable ways, 280 thus increasing long-term drought vulnerability. To the extent that New Deal policies relied on loans that required repayment either in cash or in commodities, crop insurance that required payment of premiums, and conservation payments tied to planting allotments and quotas, the programs required farmers to internalize some of the risk of drought and other production barriers. On the other hand, producer risk decisions were distorted by guarantees such as direct parity payments, subsidies in the form of below-market crop insurance rates, loan liability limited to the value of the crops as collateral, and adjustment of production levels to account for drought and other losses.
Two factors might have caused Congress to abandon price supports and production controls as the Great Depression ended. Demand for agricultural commodities skyrocketed during World War II due to production declines in the war zones, and 1930s droughts gave way to favorable weather during the 1940s. 281 However, to encourage high wartime production and ensure that farmers shared in profits generated by the war, Congress increased loan rates and price supports during the war, as well as the number of commodities covered. 282 Although wartime programs did not alter U.S. drought and agricultural policy, they hinted that temporary programs adopted to address the drought and depression would give way to the permanent decoupling of U.S. agriculture from free market forces.
c. Post-War Drought and Agricultural Policy U.S. drought and agricultural policies during the Cold War (roughly 1949 through the early 1970s) continued to send mixed signals about the degree to which farmers should internalize drought risk into production decisions. Despite the end of the market crisis and volatility generated by the Great Depression (crop surpluses) and World War II (crop shortages), Congress did not withdraw from widescale federal intervention into agricultural markets. With respect to drought relief specifically, however, the post-war period reflected a tension between a return to free market approaches during the Eisenhower Administration and growing interest in public disaster preparedness as a Cold War strategy. 279 See HEAVEN'S TABLELAND, supra note 10, at 167, 179, 181 (farmers planted in the hope of better conditions). 280 Such practices might include planting drought-resistant crops or crop varieties, cultivating only in productive soils, using water-efficient tilling and irrigation methods, fallowing acreage during the worst droughts, and diversifying the farm economy rather than relying exclusively on monocultures of commodity crops. 281 See Opie, supra note 10, at 251; HEAVEN'S TABLELAND, supra note 10, at 267-76. 282 See HISTORY OF AGRICULTURAL PRICE-SUPPORT AND ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMS, supra note 232, at 16-17. Beginning in the 1950s, many aspects of federal drought policy were tied to legislation governing other disaster relief. 283 This trend began with Public Law 81-875, 284 adopted in 1950 and creating the familiar process under which state governors may request, and presidents may declare, disasters 285 "of sufficient severity and magnitude to warrant disaster assistance by the Federal Government to supplement" state and local efforts and resources. 286 Because the law provided no additional guidance on the nature, severity, geographic extent, or duration of disasters sufficient to warrant an emergency declaration, the law conferred tremendous discretion on the President to decide "how bad is bad enough" to justify federal disaster assistance.
Public Law 875 did not provide financial payments or other monetary relief, but authorized the federal government to provide equipment, supplies, personnel, distribution of food and medicine; and to protect lives and property and make emergency repairs and temporarily replace public facilities. 287 However, in later disaster relief statutes Congress authorized loans and other financial relief for areas in which the President issued a disaster declaration. 288 Although these measures constituted a subsidy to the extent that they provided credit not available on the private market, 289 they did so only through loans rather than outright grants or relief payments, and with a provision specifically designed to limit assistance to operations that remained viable. This pattern continued in subsequent targeted drought and disaster relief bills passed through the 1970s, 290 including the Disaster Relief Act of 1974 (sometimes referred to as the "Stafford Act"), 291 which comprehensively revised and broadened the scope of federal relief for all kinds of disasters, including drought, 292 and retained but modified the basic format of gubernatorial request and presidential declaration of disaster emergencies and major disasters.
Similarly, federal agricultural policy continued to provide both incentives and disincentives to reduce drought vulnerability. Immediately after World War II, ongoing federal intervention into the agricultural economy was hardly a foregone conclusion. Just as Congress intended that the New Deal agricultural program would expire when the economic emergency subsided, it provided that wartime agricultural subsidy programs would terminate two years after the end of hostilities. 294 When that time of reckoning arrived, however, Congress determined that absence of the wartime stimulus not only supported continuation of the program, but with even higher levels of subsidies. 295 In the Agricultural Act of 1949, 296 Congress reaffirmed the dual goals of production controls and parity prices. Despite ongoing structural changes in U.S. agriculture from a large number of small farms to increasing concentration of farms and products, 297 the post-war decision to continue price supports and production controls occurred without a fundamental reconsideration of whether the agricultural sector could now self-regulate production in response to prices better than it had during previous eras.
If anything, federal agricultural programs expanded in the post-war era. The 1949 Act authorized the Secretary of Agriculture to continue agricultural price supports via loans, purchases, or other methods, with strong preferences to producers who cooperate with established, crop-specific marketing quotas, but with even higher minimum and maximum levels of support relative to the parity price. 298 Moreover, in addition to "basic agricultural commodities," 299 the 1949 Act added specified "nonbasic agricultural commodities" at different support levels. 300 Otherwise, Congress largely reaffirmed the basic precepts of the existing statutes. 301 The Cold War also increased incentives to expand international markets in friendly nations at the expense of Communist countries. In the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, 302 Congress authorized the President to negotiate agreements with "friendly nations or organizations of friendly nations" 303 to sell surplus agricultural commodities in return for foreign currencies, 304 and to use those currencies to further develop agricultural markets, among other purposes. 305 Although motivated mainly by foreign policy, 306 this strategy continued to shift the focus from curtailing agricultural production to encouraging domestic surpluses for international trade. 307 Nevertheless, Congress continued price supports and production controls for commodity crops, but with fine-tuning through periodic "farm bills," typically in 5-year intervals, which reauthorized but modified the commodity-specific "permanent provisions" of earlier law. 308 Congress continued to assert that federal price supports and production controls were essential to the national economy and that, without them, increased productivity per acre would outstrip demand, causing prices to plummet, agricultural markets to collapse, and farms to fail. 309 Therefore, farm legislation during this period tried to balance the goal of matching supply and demand to maintain stable prices with the goal of expanding export markets. In the 1970 farm bill, 310 for example, Congress maintained but specified price supports and planting limitations established in earlier law, 311 and extended the export development policy. 312 Federal crop subsidies continued to offset farming risk so long as producers planted the specified amount of acreage, which was fixed based on past planting patterns rather than current conditions.
Thus, despite the return to economic prosperity and more conservative leadership after World War II, Cold War disaster planning mentality, foreign policy motivations, and farmers' expectations of ongoing government support led Congress to perpetuate the price supports and production controls begun during the New Deal. It also led to a patchwork of federal disaster relief efforts droughts. Drought relief continued to focus on loans, which ensured that producers continued to bear some risk of bad weather, and thus had some incentive to take drought risk into account in planting decisions. However, federal commodity programs likely overwhelmed incentives in loan-based disaster relief efforts in terms of their effect on producer planting decisions. Virtually guaranteed income, on top of additional subsidies provided by crop insurance and disaster loans, significantly reduced the need for farmers to incorporate the risk of loss into production decisions. Moreover, farm bill programs encouraged farmers to plant commodity crops at the expense of a more diverse and more drought-tolerant mix of crops.
d. The "Free Market" Evolution of U.S. Agricultural Law and Policy
U.S. agricultural laws and policies morphed during the 1970s and 1980s in ways that increased incentives for over-production and unsustainable farming practices, 314 including expanded production in areas that face increased water scarcity. Those policies, boosted by massive federal subsidies to flood the world market with cheap commodity crops, now encourage U.S. farmers to expand production of commodity crops despite plummeting global commodity prices and significant resulting reductions in net farm income. 315 In the long run, absent a shift to more sustainable practices, those incentives could render farmers in the Great Plains and other regions more vulnerable to drought, whether induced by climate disruption or otherwise, just as they were in the late 1920s and early 1930s. 316 a combination of economic tools, it minimized the role of parity price supports 319 in favor of a new program of target prices and deficiency payments designed to guarantee certain levels of revenue for major commodity producers, with guaranteed adjustments for drought and other disasters. 320 From the 1930s through the 1960s, Congress approved significant federal subsidies, but nevertheless forced farmers to internalize at least some of the risks of planting decisions. The virtually guaranteed price subsidies in the 1973 legislation further reduced incentives for planters to account for drought risk in deciding what to plant, and when. Ironically, although the program was sold as a "free market" approach to agricultural policy because it allows prices to fluctuate based on actual market supply and demand rather than government dictates, it functions as anything but a free market from the perspective of the government's increased subsidization of U.S agriculture.
Although others have traced the complicated history of subsequent farm bills, 321 Congress has retained the direct payment approach to farm subsidies, combined with a new set of loan provisions that further reduced farmer planting risk regardless of weather or market conditions. 322 For several farm bill cycles, Congress retained the dual system of loans plus deficiency payments, with crop-specific finetuning based on market conditions and political pressures. 323 In the Food Security Act of 1985, 324 Congress added "marketing loans" that allow farmers to store commodities when prices are low and to repay the loans when the market improves. 325 In the Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act of 1966 ("FAIRA"), 326 Congress replaced target prices and deficiency payments with "production flexibility contracts" in which farmers received guaranteed direct payments tied to their contract acreage, which Congress later augmented with additional emergency payments when market conditions failed to improve. 327 In the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002, 328 Congress added "countercyclical" payments when commodity prices fell below statutory targets based on historical averages. 329 All of these changes since 1973 could reduce drought vulnerability in some ways while increasing it in others. Direct payments, marketing loans and counter-cyclical payments offset the risk farmers take in meeting society's need for food and fiber, thus meeting Congress' long-term goal of stabilizing farm income while ensuring a sufficient and reasonably priced food supply. Moreover, by basing direct payments on historical acreage rather than actual production, Congress gave farmers the flexibility to fallow lands under poor conditions and still receive some income for that acreage. 330 On the other hand, those guarantees have encouraged overproduction of statutory commodity crops. 331 Among other social, economic and environmental problems caused by those incentives, 332 agricultural subsidies promote crop selection based on subsidies rather than climatic or other environmental factors, and planting decisions based on guaranteed payments rather than water supply and soil conditions. Federal production limits and land conservation programs begun in the 1938 Soil Conservation Act provide counter-incentives through voluntary programs to protect sensitive acreage and to curtail production. Those included the "Soil Bank" program established temporarily in 1956, 333 and a wide range of more recent programs 334 for which Congress has increased funding in recent decades. 335 Those programs could serve as tools for federal drought prevention policy by conditioning subsidies on sustainable water use. However, agricultural conservation provisions have received mixed reviews in terms of effectiveness in protecting the environment. 336 Ultimately, the question is whether incentives to reduce drought vulnerability through conservation programs can override stronger incentives to continue excess production of commodity crops given the vastly higher funding levels Congress has devoted to those programs, 337 and ongoing efforts to expand U.S. agricultural export markets. Moreover, none of the existing conservation programs focus primarily on water use.
e. Ongoing Problems in Federal Agricultural and Drought Policy
From the perspective of reducing drought vulnerability, not much has changed in federal agricultural or drought law and policy since the 1970s. Congress largely continued the "free market" policies begun in 1973 in the most recent farm bill, the Food, Conservation and Energy Act of 2008. 338 New incentives to grow corn for biofuels reinforce those incentives. 339 To the extent that Congress has adopted drought-specific legislation, it has fallen prey to the "hydro-illogical cycle" and tended to do so on an ad hoc basis in response to individual droughts, with the response proportional to the pressure from constituents for relief. 340 Drought management experts and government agencies and commissions have continued to criticize this practice as producing relief measures that are ineffective, poorly coordinated, and short-term and reactive in focus. 341 An ad hoc, emergency-oriented legislative practice can also be criticized because it distorts whatever risk allocation principles and incentives for sustainability may be included in state or federal water law. When legislatures pass drought relief solely in response to individual crises, it is too late to adopt policies to require or encourage water users to engage in sound risk management and more sustainable practices. Especially given political pressure to help desperate constituents, emergency legislation inevitably focuses almost entirely on providing physical and financial relief.
Comprehensive federal drought legislation was proposed in Congress in 2003 342 in response to findings of the National Drought Policy Commission, 343 but has not been enacted to date. Congress has, however, adopted discrete provisions that move in the direction of a more coherent federal drought policy. 344 Legislation adopted independent of a particular drought could focus on risk reduction by promoting sustainable water use and management in advance of a crisis, in addition to addressing drought planning, forecasting, communication and coordination. It could also expressly condition drought relief on adoption of responsible risk reduction measures. An anticipatory approach can be more objective because it separates long-term policy decisions from impacts to particular constituents. Of course, the necessary corollary would be subsequent legislative discipline, i.e., Congress would need to avoid the inclination to bail out those who fail to respond to incentives in the omnibus legislation.
The ability of federal drought relief programs to reduce vulnerability has also been plagued by the same absence of consistent definitions as occur in other areas of water and drought law. In response to serious droughts during the mid-1970s, for example, a federal interagency committee designated counties eligible for federal relief absent any clear legal standard or guidance. 345 Presumably in the face of political pressure, two thirds of the Nation's counties were designated drought disaster areas, making them eligible for federal relief. 346 That unguided approach likely resulted in undeserving aid recipients and spread resources so thinly that others may not have received necessary aid.
During the 1970s, federal agencies also applied differing drought definitions to identify eligible aid recipients. 347 Although varying criteria may be appropriate for different relief, critics suggested that those differences were more ad hoc than well considered. 348 Federal agencies continue to use different criteria for determining eligibility for drought relief or assistance. 349 On the other hand, there has been a move to systematize and coordinate dissemination of drought information through projects such as the U.S. Drought Monitor, 350 the North American Drought Monitor, 351 and the Seasonal Drought Outlook.
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Although those efforts do not provide legally binding drought definitions, they help cultivate common standards and nomenclature for understanding and communicating drought information.
IV. CONCLUSION: BALANCING COMPASSION AND RISK IN A DISRUPTED CLIMATE
In a disrupted climate, agriculture and certain other economic sectors will be forced to undertake increased risks caused by other economy activities. Although agriculture contributes to climate disruption, 353 it is arguably inequitable to require one economic sector to internalize a disproportionate share of external costs of global problems generated by many others. That is particularly true for an economic sector like agriculture that provides some of society's basic needs. Whether induced by compassion, politics or other factors, that suggests efforts to compensate those who bear an unfair risk burden on behalf of others. However, measures to spread the risk of climate disruption could have the negative effect of increasing vulnerability by subsidizing activities that increase drought and other risks. In this regard, drought and other disaster response policies that might be appropriate for occasional and difficult to foresee events may no longer be appropriate for conditions that occur with increasing frequency due to climate disruption. One role of law is to allocate risk fairly, and in a way that achieves sound public policy goals. A second role of law is to promote or require behavioral changes deemed beneficial to the community.
These factors suggest that climate adaptation strategies should reflect a considered judgment about the appropriate balance between compensating victims of climate disruption and reducing longterm vulnerability. In the case of climate-induced changes in drought frequency, severity and geographic scope, that will require serious rethinking of drought law and policy in particular, and more fundamental aspects of water and agricultural law and policy as well.
In establishing programs to provide drought relief, the definition of drought should be based on consistent policy decisions about how the risk of water shortages should be distributed. Declaring drought (and providing relief) too readily can discourage prevention and risk reduction, while declaring drought too late can result in significant hardship and secondary impacts. Thus, any comprehensive federal drought legislation should identify consistent principles governing when federal drought relief or other responses should be triggered. 354 Moreover, drought relief can effectively be balanced against risk reduction goals by providing relief only to those who take appropriate measures to reduce vulnerability, such as switching to low water demand crops in drought-prone regions, or improving irrigation or other water use efficiency. 350 See http://drought.unl.edu/dm. This tool is designed to provide a comprehensive assessment of drought conditions across the country at particular points in time. 354 Given the complexity of drought monitoring and definitions, it is probably necessary to delegate the task of adopting specific numeric drought criteria to administrative agencies. Moreover, it may be that regional variation is necessary to reflect the diversity of climatic, hydrological, and other conditions in the United States.
Those improvements alone, however, although extremely important, may be too narrow to address the increasing frequency and severity of drought that may accompany climate disruption. Underlying patterns of human land and water use increase water demand and thus exacerbate the effects of reduced water supply. 355 That suggests broader changes in laws and policies that affect the places, purposes, and efficiencies of water use. Although water law has long been criticized for protecting existing uses at the expense of efficiency and shifting societal needs and preferences, 356 changes that increase incentives to use water more sustainably and to eliminate impediments to water transfers will become even more important. Moreover, it may be preferable to adopt drought-neutral approaches to water law, or to condition any changes to water rights during drought on prior efforts to reduce drought vulnerability. Providing relief from the regular requirements of water law in the case of drought may protect existing uses in times of shortage, but at the expense of long-term vulnerability.
Finally, although agriculture is just one of the many economic sectors in which water use efficiency is important to drought vulnerability and severity, it is the area of federal law that, historically, has been most closely associated with federal drought policy and response. In many parts of the United States agriculture is the largest consumptive water user, and yet the user most likely to be adversely affected by drought. Therefore, broader changes in agricultural law and policy are necessary to reduce drought vulnerability in the face of climate disruption. Rather than continuing to promote excess production of a predetermined set of commodity crops irrespective of climatic and other conditions, federal agricultural law should promote production of the most appropriate crops based on water supply, temperature, and other conditions in particular regions in the face of climate disruption. If federal agricultural law and policy, along with its massive historic subsidies, continues to serve as the primary factor motivating economic decisions about what crops to plant, and where, changes to water and drought law and policy will play, at best, only a minor role in reducing drought vulnerability. U.S. water, drought and agricultural law provide just one example of the need to balance compassion and risk in climate adaptation policies. The same basic lesson may be appropriate to economic sectors affected by other impacts of climate disruption. Examples include real estate developers facing risks from sea level rise and electric power suppliers facing higher demand as temperatures rise. The compassionate or political impulse may be to provide subsidies or other financial relief from those impacts. But in addition to becoming increasingly and perhaps impossibly expensive, those responses may only perpetuate the very activities that increase long-term vulnerability. Rather than adopting climate adaptation policies through after-the-fact, band-aid solutions, the most effective responses should consider the basic economic drivers of activities that increase vulnerability to climate disruption. 355 See Wilhite & Buchanan-Smith, supra note 24, at 10 (discussing "human-induced drought" where demand exceeds supply even during times of normal precipitation); COPING WITH WATER SCARCITY, supra note 6, at 9-10 (distinguishing between natural conditions leading to drought and human-induced water shortages). 356 See Wilkinson, supra note 93.
